While a key function of contracts is to provide incentives, the incentives of judges to enforce the terms of a contract have rarely been examined. This paper develops a simple model of judicial agency in which judges are corrupt and can be bribed by contracting parties. Higher-powered contracts expose contracting parties to more frequent and more severe corruption, which in turn lessens the incentives actually provided by the contract. Consequently the model predicts that individuals will commonly refrain from writing high-powered contracts, even when such contracts would be valuable absent judicial agency. I show that similar implications can also be obtained by considering other forms of imperfection in contract enforcement, such as variable expenditures on legal representation. I use the model to develop implications for the optimal punishment of individuals who are extorted by corrupt judges, and to establish circumstances under which a right-of-appeal is optimal.
Introduction
Contract theory studies the provision of incentives to economic agents who need to be persuaded to act against their own immediate interests. As such, contracts need to be enforced. However, despite the emphasis on incentive problems very little attention has been paid to the incentives of the contract enforcer, a role that in modern economies is most often played by a judge. Instead, there has been virtual unanimity among contract theorists that judges will enforce contracts exactly as intended.
1 This paper relaxes the assumption that judges behave perfectly, and presents a variant of the standard principalagent model in which a judge can (at some cost) accept bribes not to enforce a contract.
The basic argument of the paper is that foreseeing that they will be exploited ex post, contracting parties will respond to judicial agency by limiting the power they give to the judge ex ante. In other words, they cease to contract and/or omit contingencies from the contract in order to prevent a judge from extracting a bribe ex post by manipulating how the contingency is enforced. This effect will be more pronounced when the incentives that need to be provided to the agent are high and when corruption is more of a problem within the judiciary. Moreover, since corruption is more likely to go undetected in situations calling for substantial judicial interpretation, it follows that contracts contingent on circumstances hard to unambiguously specify will be harder to write.
Most legal histories suggest that judicial agency was an important phenomenon historically, while both anecdotal and survey evidence suggest that it is still widespread in developing countries today. Below, I review some of this evidence, along with some contemporary instances of judicial agency in the U.S. Moreover, although for the most part I will speak of judges as accepting bribes, the formal model is closely related to one in which contracting parties hire lawyers to represent them, and the more resources they spend on legal representation the more likely it is they win a case independent of its merits (see subsection 3.6 below).
After studying the implications of judicial agency on contracting, the paper turns to a couple of ways in which its effects can be ameliorated.
First, opinion is divided on whether or not to punish an individual who illicitly pays a judge only in response to a threat of an unfair decision (i.e., extortion). The argument against such punishments is that they make it harder for the party in the right to prevail in court. Conversely, the argument in favor is that punishing extortion reduces its incidence. The analysis shows that under many conditions the first effect dominates, and extortion should not be punished. The key reason is that in litigation between two parties, extortion by the judge is only credible if the party in the wrong tries to bribe the judge, but in this case punishing the party in the right for making competing payments makes matters worse. Thus there is an incentive-based reason to refrain from punishing individuals who pay judges when threatened with bad outcomes, even without considering issues of "fairness." Second, arguably the most important check placed on judicial discretion is oversight by other judges, and in particular, the possibility of appeal. I use the model to analyze possible appeal arrangements, and show that only the party being incentivized by the contract should enjoy the right of appeal. (This corresponds to widespread protection against "double-jeopardy" for criminal defendants.)
The basic model of the paper is as follows. A principal seeks to contract with an agent, who can take either a good or bad action. The agent prefers the bad action, while the good action generates a greater total surplus. In order to persuade the agent to take the good action, the principal and agent can write a contract in which the agent is punished if she takes the bad action, and/or rewarded if she does not. Given the contract, the principal and agent can make illicit payments to the judge in order to affect the court decision. It is costly (in terms of risk of punishment, reputation, and moral repugnance) for the judge to accept these payments, and also costly for him to change his decision in response, and judges differ in the magnitude of these costs.
Potential bribes are larger when the agent needs to be given stronger incentives. But the availability of larger bribes increases the number of judges who prefer to take bribes rather than behave honestly. Increased corruption in turn decreases the incentives actually provided by any given contract, so the original contract must be amended to provide additional incentives to compensate for the possibility that some judges will behave corruptly. But of course, these additional incentives lead to yet higher potential bribes, which in turn necessitate yet higher incentives.
Consequently, contracts that supply large incentives expose the parties involved to high corruption costs. Moreover, there is an upper limit to the incentives that a contract can supply -attempting to supply further incentives simply increases the expected bribes paid. In general, the model predicts that individuals are more likely to contract ex ante when the value of doing so is high, when the incentives that the contract must supply are low, and when judges face high costs of behaving corruptly. Conversely, there exists a wide range of circumstances in which parties do not contract even when it would be beneficial do so in the absence of judicial agency. One interpretation of this predicted absence of apparently desirable contracts is as an instance of contractual incompleteness.
While some existing work deals with the corruption of law enforcers (see, e.g., Becker and Stigler 1974, or more recently Polinsky and Shavell 2001) , the focus of this work has generally been on issues such as how corruption affects the deterrence effect of existing laws, and how one should optimally monitor and compensate law enforcers. Although related, the focus of this paper is on the distinct question of what contracts are worthwhile when the contract enforcer is corrupt. Closer in spirit to this paper are Friedman (1999) , Mui (1999) , Anderlini, Felli and Postlewaite (2007 , 2009 ), and Glaeser and Shleifer (2002 . Friedman identifies the possibility of extortion by enforcing authorities as a reason to limit the size of the punishment. Mui analyzes the standard hold-up problem of the incomplete contract literature in a setting where ex post renegotiation is in part determined by the possibility of litigating in a corrupt court. Anderlini, Felli and Postlewaite consider a court that voids some contracts so as to maximize individuals' ex ante utility, and explore the consequences for relation-specific investments and for insurance against unforeseen contingencies. Glaeser and Shleifer seek to explain the evolution of English Common Law and French Civil Law in terms of the relative power of citizens, self-interested judges and the head of state. Finally, a contemporaneous paper by Immordino and Pagano (forthcoming) studies optimal regulation in the presence of a corrupt enforcer.
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On a analytical level this paper is also related to those of Spier (1994) , Bernardo et al (2000) , and Legros and Newman (2002) , all three of which study the interaction between an underlying agency problem and the expenditures parties can make to influence the contract outcome. The current paper differs from the first two of these in that higher-powered contracts lead not only to greater litigation expenditures, but that these expenditures in turn reduce the incentives provided by a contract and necessitate a still higher-powered contract. It is this feedback effect that accounts for why high-powered contracts are particularly expensive to write. Legros and Newman allow for feedback to contract terms, but consider a simple model in which parties either spend nothing on litigation, or a fixed amount c. In contrast, much of the analysis and results in the current paper relates to the size of payments that parties make to the judge.
3 Moreover, in focusing on judicial corruption in place of general litigation (or "interference," in the case of Legros and Newman) costs, the current paper gives a distinct explanation for the source of the link between agency problems and the extent to which they can be solved with laws and contracts. In particular, the focus on corruption allows the current paper to address the difference between extortion and bribe-taking.
Finally, the paper is conceptually related to the literatures on influence activities inside a firm (Milgrom 1988) and to collusion in principal-supervisoragent models (Tirole 1986 ). In particular, it shares the prediction that highpowered contracts engender collusion/influence-seeking. The current paper adds to this general insight by showing the existence of a vicious circle in which higher-powered contracts lead to more corruption, which undercuts incentives and necessitates even higher-powered contracts;
4 by analyzing a situation in which two parties simultaneously engage in competing influence activities; by comparing extortion and bribe-taking; and by considering appeals rights.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives some background examples of judicial corruption. Section 3 presents the basic model of judicial corruption. Section 4 explores several applications of the model. Section 5 examines the comparative severity with which different forms of corrupt activity should be punished. Section 6 analyzes appeals arrangements. Section 7 discusses some robustness issues. Section 8 concludes.
Background
The key assumption of the paper is that individuals who enforce contracts are sometimes corrupt. In many cases the contract enforcer is a judge. Although judges occupy a position of unusual respect in many peoples' imagination, Instances in which judicial corruption is actually detected provide one source of evidence, albeit anecdotal in character. To give just a couple of examples, within the U.S. (where courts are often assumed to be relatively free of corruption) Judges Victor Barron and Gerald Garson were convicted of corrupt behavior in Brooklyn civil courts, in 2002 and 2007 respectively.
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One could give many more examples along these lines. The case of Caperton v Massey provides a more contentious example with much higher stakes: in 2004, while Massey was in the process of appealing a prior $50M judgement, Massey's CEO made a $3M contribution to the election campaign of Judge Brent Benjamin, who subsequently ruled in Massey's favor.
The various corrupt dealings of Vladimiro Montesinos in Peru provide somewhat more systematic evidence. Montesinos was a powerful chief of Peru's secret police, and required his counterparties in corrupt deals to sign "contracts." Additionally, he videotaped many of the illicit negotiations (see, for example, McMillan and Zoido 2004) . Consequently, in this case one has close to a comprehensive catalogue of individuals who entered corrupt deals with Montesinos, and judges figure prominently.
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More systematic evidence is provided by surveys conducted in transition economies by the World Bank. Hellman et al (2000) report that in the 22 countries surveyed, an average of 18% of firms interviewed stated that they were significantly affected by the "purchase of criminal courts" and the "purchase of commercial courts." In Azerbaijan, these figures were as high as 44% for criminal courts and 40% for commercial courts. An even more negative view of the court system emerges from a survey conducted by the Taiwanese magazine, the CommonWealth, and cited by Mui (page 250, 1999) . Only one third of the 1,215 respondents stated that it was unnecessary "to offer a bribe to the judge to win litigation".
Finally, any reading of legal history makes clear that judicial corruption is very much the historical norm.
8 Perhaps in reaction to this, modern legal systems include a number of features that serve to limit the power and discretion of the judge, such as appeal rights -analyzed in more detail in Section 6 below.
Judicial Agency
The paper studies the impact of judicial agency on contracting in the context of the following (extremely simple) moral hazard problem. A principal P wants an agent A to take a good action (G) over a bad action (B). The combined surplus of the two individuals when the good action is chosen is s, while the agent prefers taking the bad action by an amount z. To focus the analysis on how judicial agency affects contracting, I assume throughout that the principal observes the agent's action 9 a ∈ {B, G}. Both the principal and agent are assumed to be risk-neutral.
In this simple setting, the only function of a contract is to either reward the agent when he takes the good action, and/or punish him when he takes the bad action. So a contract stipulates a transfer t G to be made from the principal to the agent when the agent takes the good action, and a transfer t B to be made when the agent takes the bad action. When t G < 0 or t B < 0, then the transfer is understood to be from the agent to the principal. Given a contract (t G , t B ), let Z (t G , t B )≡t G − t B denote the contractual incentives provided to the agent to take the good action. As we will see, once one takes into account judicial agency the actual incentives provided to the agent will typically be less than the contractual incentives Z.
Whenever the contract stipulates that either the principal or agent make a transfer to the other party, an enforcement authority is required to make sure the transfer takes place. The paper typically refers to the enforcement authority as the judge, although clearly multiple parts of the justice system will be engaged in carrying out the judge's decision.
To keep the analysis as transparent as possible, I assume moreover that the judge observes the agent's action a. It is of course important that the agent's action is not completely publicly observable, since in this case judicial agency would be trivial to deter. Moreover, the assumption that the judge observes the agent's action can itself be relaxed without significantly changing the paper's main results -details are available from the author upon request.
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If the judge enforces the contract terms as intended, then the agent takes the good action if the contractual incentives Z (t G , t B ) exceed the agent's pri-9 If the principal observed only a noisy signal of the agent's action, the judicial agency problem would be worsened since the difference between the most and least favorable outcomes mandated by the contract would be increased.
10 If the judge does not directly observe the agent's action then the contract needs to be designed so as to induce the principal and agent to truthfully report it. It can be shown that this additional complication has relatively little effect on the amount of equilibrium corruption.
vate benefit from taking the bad action, z.
However, the judge may lack incentives to enforce the contract. For example, suppose that the agent has taken the good action. According to the contract, the principal should pay t G to the agent. But if the principal pays a bribe the judge might be tempted to wrongly rule in his favor and instead impose the transfer t B < t G .
11 Likewise, the judge might demand a payment from the agent in order to rule correctly for him. Following Lindgren (1993) and Ayres (1997) , I will refer to the first case as judicial bribe-taking, and to the second case as judicial extortion. That is, bribe-taking is when a party pays for a better outcome than deserved; extortion is when a party pays to avoid a worse outcome than is deserved.
Modelling corruption
Judicial corruption can be modelled in many ways. In this paper I follow an approach popular in the rent-seeking literature and model the court's decision as the outcome of an all-pay auction, 12 in which both the principal and agent have the opportunity to make illicit payments to the judge with the aim of influencing him. In an all-pay auction, the "seller" -here, the judgekeeps all payments, and gives the "good" -here, the favorable ruling -to the party who pays the most. In the context of judicial corruption, the "allpay" assumption captures the idea that, because the payments are illicit, the judge is not contractually obliged to decide the case in favour of a party who pays him, and is free to simply keep all payments. At the same time, the all-pay framework assumes that the judge treats a party who makes a larger payment more favorably, despite the lack of contractual obligation. This favoritism may stem from the need for judges who accept illicit payments to maintain some reputation for "honoring" these payments; from the threat of retribution at the hands of disappointed payers; or may arise simply because the judge is genuinely unsure how the case should be decided, and looks more favorably on a party who makes a generous "gift." Regardless of the exact motive, it is hard to see how judicial corruption can occur at all unless, on average, judges respond to illicit payments.
13
11 If the parties contract at all they set t G > t B ; if instead they set t G ≤t B , the agent takes action a = B, which is the same action he takes absent any contract.
12 See, e.g., Baye et al (1993 Baye et al ( , 2005 , and Siegel (2009) . 13 While the all-pay framework effectively assumes that the judge has some ability to commit, it stops short of assuming full-commitment. If instead the judge were able to fully commit, he would (in terms of notation introduced below) extort Z −γ e from the party in the right whenever α e +γ e < Z. Qualitatively, the paper's main results would remain Importantly, I assume that the judge responds differently to payments from the two parties, depending on the agent's action a. Specifically, suppose the agent took action a = G (respectively, a = B), and so the judge should rule in his favor. In this case, and as formalized below, I assume that if the two parties pay the judge a roughly similar amount, the judge will rule -correctly -in favor of the agent (respectively, the principal). For the remainder of the paper, I refer to a party as being in the right if he deserves to win the case, and being in the wrong if he deserves to lose, e.g., the agent is in the right after a = G and in the wrong after a = B. Thus the party in the right has a "head start" in court over the party in the wrong. When courts are very corrupt, both parties may make large illicit payments, and the value to the agent of taking action G rather than B stems almost entirely from the value of this head start; and is little affected by actual contractual incentives Z (see Proposition 2).
Formally, denote any illicit payments made by the principal and agent as x P ≥0 and x A ≥0 respectively. To capture the idea that payments are illegal, I assume there is a fixed cost to each party of making a strictly positive payment, and a fixed cost to the judge of accepting any strictly positive payment. These fixed costs also imply that many contracting parties make no illicit payment, even when dealing with a judge who is very corrupt. At the same time, these fixed costs somewhat complicate the analysis by introducing discontinuities in the all-pay auction: by way of contrast, even Siegel's (2009) otherwise general analysis of all-pay contests assumes continuity.
14 Suppose first that the agent took action a = G, and so is the party in the right. Consequently, any payment from the agent is the outcome of extortion, in the sense discussed above. Let γ e be the agent's cost of offering a strictly positive payment, x A > 0, and α e be the judge's cost of accepting the payment. Likewise, any payment from the principal is an instance of judicial bribetaking. Let γ b be the principal's cost of offering a strictly positive payment, x P > 0, and α b be the judge's cost of accepting the payment.
Clearly the judge only accepts payments x A ≥α e and x P ≥α b . Consequently, I assume without loss that the agent (principal) either makes no payment, x A = 0 (x P = 0) or makes a payment x A ≥α e (x P ≥α b ), and the payment is accepted. The acceptance costs α e and α b affect not only whether a judge accepts a payment, but also how much these payments influence him -other things equal, the more costly it is for a judge to accept an illicit payment, the less that payment is likely to sway him. If both parties make positive unchanged.
14 In Section 7 I discuss an alternative specification of costs.
payments the judge rules for the agent if and only if
where α 0 is the cost to the judge of ruling wrongly (he may find this morally objectionable, and wrong decisions may hurt a judge's career). If only the principal makes a positive payment, the judge rules in his favor if and only if x P −α b −α 0 ≥0. Otherwise the judge rules correctly for the agent. The principal and the agent have the same "skill" in making payments to the judge, and so the costs associated with payments depend only on which party is in the right. If the agent took action a = B he deserves to lose in court, and the costs are reversed relative to the case a = G. Specifically, the costs to the agent and judge associated with making and accepting a payment are γ b and α b , since such payments now represent bribe-taking; and the costs to the principal and judge associated with making and accepting a payment are γ e and α e , 16 since such payments now represent extortion. The judge bears an additional cost α 0 if he rules for the agent. Consequently, if both parties make positive payments the judge rules for the principal if and only if
Judges are heterogeneous, and differ in their corruption costs (α 0 ,α b ,α e ). To simplify the exposition, let α 0 +α b be drawn from a continuous distribution,
The timing is as follows. First, the principal and agent observe their costs γ b and γ e . Both parties observe both costs. Second, the contract is selected to maximize the combined expected payoff of the two parties. Third, the agent takes an action a ∈ {G, B}. Fourth, the contract is adjudicated in court: the principal and agent learn the identity of the judge, along with his corruption costs (α 0 ,α b ,α e ), and then simultaneously choose their payments x P and x A .
Court outcomes
When corruption costs are zero (i.e., α e =γ e =α b =γ b =α 0 = 0) the equilibrium of the two-player all-pay auction is well-known.
18 Both players play mixed strategies with payments drawn from a uniform density over [0, Z] , 15 Note that the tie is broken in favor of the party in the right. 16 The costs of making payments, γ e and γ b , potentially differ from each other because the penalty incurred if an illicit payment is uncovered may differ according to whether the payer is the party in the right or wrong, i.e., whether the payment is an instance of extortion or bribe-taking. See Section 5 below.
17 These continuity assumptions are used only in subsection 3.4. 18 See, for example, Baye et al (1996) .
and the "rent" of Z is completely dissipated.
19 Corruption costs complicate the analysis, and modify the conclusion that rents are fully dissipated.
Let Pr (P) and Pr (A) be the probabilities that the principal and agent win in court. The principal's expected utility from the court case is thus −t G + Z Pr (P|a) − E [x P |a] −γPr (x P > 0|a), where γ=γ b ,γ e if the agent took action a = G, B, respectively. Note that whether the principal is in the right or not affects his payoff through his probability of winning, through his expected equilibrium payment x P , and through the cost of making an illicit payment. Likewise, the agent's expected utility from the court case is t B +Z Pr (A|a)−E [x A |a]−γPr (x P > 0|a), where γ=γ e ,γ b if the agent took action a = G, B, respectively. Observe that both parties gain Z from success in court. Define the payoff functions
I analyze the equilibrium outcomes if the agent took action a = G; the case in which he took action a = B follows symmetrically. Let X P and X A be the equilibrium supports of strictly positive payments made by the principal and agent to the judge. As already noted, one can assume without loss that inf X A ≥α e , inf X P ≥α b , and the judge accepts all payments. Additionally, inf X P ≥α b +α 0 , since otherwise the principal's payment is too small to affect the judge's decision; and sup X A ≤Z −γ e and sup X P ≤Z −γ b , since the equilibrium payments of both parties are bounded above by the amount at stake in court, net of costs.
The following result summarizes several standard arguments for all-pay auctions, suitably modified for the existence of costs α 0 ,α e ,α b :
Lemma 1 (Standard all-pay auction results) Suppose the agent took action a = G. (A) There are no atoms in the agent's strategy strictly above α e , and no atoms in the principal's strategy strictly above α 0 +α b . (B) Suppose X P and X A are non-empty. Then sup X P −α b −α 0 = sup X A −α e ; inf X P −α b −α 0 = inf X A −α e = 0; and there are no holes in either X P or X A . (C) Suppose X P and X A are non-empty. Then the principal's and agent's strategies both place a uniform density of 1 Z over the interior of these sets.
As Proposition 1 below shows, the corruption costs α b ,γ b and α 0 all have qualitatively similar effects on equilibrium outcomes, since all make it easier for the party in the right to win. Likewise, the costs α e and γ e both make it harder for the party in the right to win. In fact, these costs matter only via their sums, i.e., Γ b ≡α b +γ b +α 0 and Γ e ≡α e +γ e . I make the mild assumption that these costs are lower for the party in the right than the party in the wrong:
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Proposition 1 (Equilibrium court outcomes) Suppose the agent took action a = G. An equilibrium of the payment game exists, is unique, and has the following properties: If corruption costs are high, i.e., Γ b > Z, then neither party makes a payment; the agent wins the case; V When corruption costs are low, and so both parties make payments, this result coincides with existing results for all-pay contests -see, in particular, Siegel (2009) . 21, 22 The incremental contribution of Proposition 1 is to deal with the effect of the fixed costs of making and receiving illicit payments, namely γ e ,α e ,γ b ,α b . When these costs are high, the parties abstain from making illicit payments.
An increase in the costs associated with bribery (α 0 ,α b and γ b ) increases the payoff of the party in the right (i.e., the agent, if a = G) because it makes it harder for the party in the wrong to sway the judge. In equilibrium, the party in the right benefits both because he makes smaller payments to the judge, and (even given these smaller payments) wins the case more often. Conversely, an increase in the costs associated with extortion actually make the party in the right worse off. It is now more expensive for him to compete with bribes paid by the party in the wrong. In equilibrium, he ends up making larger payments; incurring a larger cost (γ e ) to make these payments; and losing the case more often.
Incentives and contract costs
The actual incentive that a contract Z provides to the agent to take action a = G rather than a = B is simply the difference in the agent's expected payoff across these two actions. I denote the actual incentives by I (Z):
Proposition 2 (Contractual versus actual incentives)
The incentives provided by the contract are
An increase in contractual incentives Z affects the incentives I (Z) provided to the agent with an elasticity of less than unity:
Proposition 2 quantifies the extent to which court corruption reduces the incentives provided below Z. Moreover, increasing contractual incentives Z is partially self-defeating: there is now more at stake in court, so illicit payments are larger, and hence more judges behave corruptly. More formally, increases in contractual incentives have a relatively small effect on actual incentives, in the sense that the elasticity of I (Z) with respect to Z is small. Strikingly, this feedback effect from higher contractual incentives to more corrupt behavior means that even as contractual incentives are increased to arbitrarily high levels, the incentives provided to the agent are bounded above.
Asides from the incentives provided by a contract, the contracting parties also care about the cost of the contract, i.e., the resource dissipation they anticipate from corruption costs and payments to the judge. Let C (Z) be the total cost of a contract Z:
Proposition 3 (Contract costs) For contracts such that I (Z)≥z, the cost of the contract is C (Z) = Z−I (Z), and is increasing in Z.
Equilibrium incentives and costs
A contract is only worth writing if it provides enough incentives for the agent to take the good action, i.e., I (Z)≥z. From Proposition 3, the cost C (Z) is increasing in contractual incentives Z. Hence the contracting parties will always choose Z minimally, 23 subject to satisfying the incentive condition I (Z)≥z. Define
Thus when subject to the possibility of judicial corruption, the contracting parties will choose the contract (t G , t B ) to satisfy t G −t B = Z * (z). At this level of incentives, the cost of writing the contract is C (Z * (z)), the combination of direct corruption costs and expected bribes that the contracting parties will end up paying to the judge. In the case that Z * (z) = ∞ (i.e., no level of contractual incentives Z provides incentives z) let C (Z * (z)) = ∞. The function C (Z * (z)) is the equilibrium cost of providing the agent with incentives z. The next result shows that this cost increases quite steeply in z. The reason is that as z increases, the contractual terms Z needed to incentivize the agent rise more (Proposition 2). This, in turn, causes the costs of contracting to rise (by Proposition 3) quickly:
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium cost of providing sufficient incentives) The elasticity of the cost C (Z * (z)) with respect to required incentives z exceeds unity, i.e.,
is increasing in z.
Other changes in corruption costs
Corruption levels differ widely across legal jurisdictions. Formally, different levels of corruption are represented by different distributions of corruption costs. How does the overall level of corruptibility of judges affect contract incentives and costs? To formalize what it means for one pool of judges to be more corrupt than another, it is useful to make the following assumption, which guarantees that judicial populations can be totally ordered in terms of corruptibility:
23 See Glaeser and Shliefer (2003) and Malik (1990) for related observations. A judge's extortion costs α e may well be positively correlated with his bribe-taking cost α b and his cost of ruling wrongly, α 0 . Assumption 2, which is used only in Proposition 5, simply says that as α 0 and α b increase, any corresponding increase in the conditional expectation of α e is (weakly) less than the increase in α 0 +α b .
Given Assumption 2, I define a pool of judges as being less corrupt than a second pool if the corruption costs α 0 +α b are higher in the first pool, in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance:
Proposition 5 (Changes in judicial corruptibility) Suppose the distribution of α 0 +α b in one pool of judges first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of α 0 +α b in a second pool, and that Assumption 2 is satisfied for both pools. Then contractual incentives I (·) are lower for the second pool, while both required incentives Z * (z) and the cost of contracting C (Z * (z)) are higher for the second pool.
Alternate interpretation: expenditures on lawyers
Thus far I have interpreted the payments x A and x P as illicit payments to judges. The judge decides for the agent after a = G provided that x P exceeds x A by less than α 0 +α b −α e , that is, the cost of deciding wrongly for the principal combined with the difference (if any) of the cost of accepting illicit payments from the two parties. However, one can also interpret x A and x P as expenditures on lawyers, where greater expenditures translate to a greater chance of winning the case. In particular, consider the special case in which α e =α b =γ e =γ b = 0. Under the alternative interpretation, the judge decides for the agent after a = G provided that x P exceeds x A by less than α 0 , where α 0 reflects the agent's natural advantage in the case. That is, the principal is only successful in swaying the judge if he spends an amount α 0 more on lawyers than does the agent.
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With the exception of the discussion of punishing extortion versus bribery (see Section 5) all of the paper's analysis applies to this alternative interpretation. 25 While many papers in the legal literature analyze legal disputes as contests, relatively few papers consider the consequences for the incentives provided to the parties with regard to the "primary activity." See Sanchirico (2008) for both a discussion of this point, and a prominent exception to it.
Discussion

The costs of judicial agency
In contrast to some models of corruption, judicial corruption in the current model leads unambiguously to worse social outcomes. Specifically, judicial corruption is deleterious to welfare in the following two ways.
First, it leads to the abandonment of productive activity. That is, absent judicial corruption all principal-agent pairs would contract to supply the agent with incentives of z or more, leading to the realization of the surplus s. With judicial corruption however, some principal-agent pairs will find that the private costs C (Z * (z)) exceed the private benefits s, and will cease to contract. The surplus s is thus lost.
Second, the costs borne by judges and litigating parties who behave corruptly are deadweight costs to society. Nothing is gained by other individuals that offsets the moral discomfort judges or litigants may incur in accepting bribes, or the disutility inflicted on corrupt individuals who are subsequently punished. This is true even if one counts the corrupt payments to judges as pure transfers.
Formally, let the joint distribution of contracting opportunities (s, z) be given by F , and let 1 denote the indicator function. Let DW (Z) be the expected deadweight social cost associated with a contract Z, i.e., the expected value of all corruption costs incurred in equilibrium.
26 Note that the parties' cost of contracting, C (Z), differs from the deadweight cost, DW (Z), by the 26 The deadweight cost DW (Z) can be calculated explicitly as follows. In equilibrium, the agent takes action G. If Γ b > Z then no corruption occurs. Otherwise, if Γ b < Z the equilibrium outcomes are as described in the proof of Proposition 1. Specifically, the agent makes a strictly positive payment to the judge with probability 1 − µ A , where µ A = Γb Z . The principal makes a payment α 0 +α b with probability η P = Γe Z , makes no payment with probability µ P = µ A −η P , and makes a strictly positive payment other than α 0 +α b with probability 1−µ P −η P = 1−µ A . The judge wrongly rules for the principal with probability
Hence
expected payments to judges net of the expected corruption cost incurred in equilibrium by judges. Since judges voluntarily accept bribes, it follows that C (Z) > DW (Z). Using this notation, the total social cost of corruption is
where the first term is the welfare loss associated with foregone surplus, and the second term is the expected deadweight loss due to corrupt activity by judges. Consider a small increase in judicial corruptibility. By Proposition 5, this increases the cost of contracting. Suppose that (s, z) is a contracting opportunity that is eliminated by the increase in corruption. Before the increase in corruption, the social surplus net of deadweight corruption costs associated with (s, z) is s−DW (Z * (z)) > 0. After the increase in corruption the contracting opportunity is no longer pursued, representing a loss of social surplus.
Indeed, for severe levels of judicial corruptibility almost all the social loss Γ will be in the form of foregone surplus: since a principal-agent pair could only effectively contract at the price of exposing themselves to a large corruption cost, they will simply choose not to. Put another way, low levels of observed corruption are compatible with a high level of corruptibility, for the simple reason that when corruptibility is high no contracts are written and so no judicial corruption is possible.
Finally, increases in corruptibility correspond to lower corruption cost parameters α 0 etc. This generates a partially countervailing effect on the total social cost of corruption, namely that agents find corruption less psychologically costly and/or are punished less often and less severely.
When are contracts written?
Economists have long appreciated that not all contracts are costless to write.
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The absence of contracts (or contract clauses) that would be desirable if they could be written at zero cost is often termed "contractual incompleteness." The longest standing explanation is the existence of transaction costs. 28 See Williamson (1975) . Other more recent explanations include those of Simon (1981), Holmström and Milgrom (1991) , Bernheim and Whinston (1998) , Allen and Gale (1992) , While the contracting costs C (Z * (z)) of this paper are akin to a traditional transaction cost, they also differ in a couple of important respects. First, judicial agency locates the contracting costs with the enforcement of a contract, as opposed to with the contract-writing stage. As such, judicial agency costs are likely to be relevant even when a contract would be very beneficial, or used many times.
Second, the assumption of judicial agency provides more structure on when transaction costs are likely to be large. The key distinguishing prediction of the judicial agency approach (as opposed to a simple transaction costs approach) for contracting decisions is that contracting costs are increasing in the incentives the contract supplies. That is, the most costly contracts to write are those with high-powered incentives.
The next result summarizes the main predictions:
Proposition 6 (Implications for contracting) A principal-agent pair with a project producing surplus s if incentives z are provided to the agent will contract if and only if the surplus exceeds the cost of contracting, i.e. s≥C (Z * (z)). When the required incentives z are above some level,z say, no contract will be written, 29 no matter how large the available surplus. Finally, an increase in the corruptibility of the judiciary will lead to a reduction in contracting activity.
Proposition 6 is consistent with contractual incompleteness having important real consequences. Whenever the incentives z required to produce surplus s are large, then contracts will not be written -even though the loss from the absence of contracting is large.
Contractual incompleteness is often associated with contract contingencies that are hard to describe. If undetected corruption is easier (i.e., corruption costs are lower) in such cases, as seems likely, Proposition 5 implies that contracts are less likely to be written. Hence the analysis predicts that "indescribability" is associated with contract incompleteness.
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Spier (1992) and Segal (1999) . Simon associates contractual incompleteness with bounded rationality. Holmström and Milgrom and Bernheim and Whinston both suggest that contracting over some subset of actions will actually worsen the agency problems in other dimensions of the action space. Allen and Gale and Spier suggest that contracts are incomplete because if a party suggested the inclusion of an additional contingency he would reveal information he would rather keep hidden. Finally Segal argues that if in any state some characteristics of the desired outcome are very similar to those of other "hold-up" outcomes (a consequence of "complexity"), then ex post renegotiation will prevent an initial contract from being useful.
29 Recall that Proposition 2 shows that incentives I (Z) are bounded above. 30 Moreover, this implication is not susceptible to Maskin and Tirole's (1999) critique of
Penalties for extortion and bribe-taking
As noted, judicial corruption can take two (closely related) forms. On the one hand, a judge can threaten a party with the imposition of a worse outcome than he deserves, unless a bribe is paid. Alternatively, a judge can accept a bribe from a party to deliver better treatment than is deserved. Consistent both with popular and academic usage, I have termed the first activity extortion and the second bribe-taking. Both opinion and practice are divided as to whether an individual who pays a judge in response to extortion deserves the same punishment as one found guilty of bribing a judge. For example, Lindgren (1993) notes that "although the morality of giving in to a coercive extortion threat has been debated for centuries, capitulating is often not illegal. Many people would not consider it bribery for a citizen to pay off a public official who is forcing the citizen to buy back what ought to be his for free."
31 The view that bribepaying in response to extortive threats is acceptable can of course be justified on "fairness" grounds. However, this leniency has the potential cost of making extortion easier and more prevalent.
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The model delivers a clear prediction on the comparative merits of punishing extortion and bribe-taking. To see this, note first that analytically a punishment for extortion acts like an increase in α e and γ e (depending on whether the judge or litigating party is punished). Likewise, a punishment for bribe-taking acts like an increase in α b and γ b . Immediate from Propositions 2 and 3:
Proposition 7 (Punishing bribe-taking and extortion) Punishing bribe-taking increases incentives I (Z) and reduces the contract cost C (Z). Punishing extortion 33 decreases incentives I (Z) and increases the contract cost C (Z).
indescribability.
31 These issues are well-illustrated by recent debates over whether or not "facilitation"' payments are covered by the US's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD's more recent Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
32 Thus Rose-Ackerman (1999, page 54) notes both that "[f]rom a pure deterrence point of view, either side of the corrupt deal can be the focus of law enforcement efforts" and "[f]rom the point of view of public acceptability, however, bribers who seek legal benefits are likely to arouse public sympathies, not blame."
33 I assume here that the punishment for extortion is such that Assumption 1 continues to hold.
The intuition behind Proposition 7 is as follows. On the one hand, punishing bribe-taking makes it harder for the party in the wrong to win a court case, and so increases the payoff of the party in the right (see Proposition 1). Since the agent is in the right after action G, and in the wrong after action B, this increases incentives. Conversely, punishing extortion makes it more expensive for the party in the right to win a court case, reducing the agent's incentives to take action G. I comment more on this result in the conclusion.
It is worth comparing Proposition 7 to the related findings of Polinsky and Shavell (2001) and Khalil et al (forthcoming) . In common with the current paper, both papers observe that extortion undermines incentives by reducing the agent's gain from taking the socially desirable action. In common with Proposition 7, Polinsky and Shavell (2001) show that punishing extortion may reduce incentives. In the current paper this effect stems from the two-sided nature of court case: punishing extortion makes it easier for the party in the wrong to win the case by bribing the judge. In contrast, Polinsky and Shavell model a contract enforcer dealing with a single agent. In their paper, the problem with punishing extortion is that the contract enforcer switches to "framing" the agent in order to receive a reward.
Khalil et al study a principal-supervisor-agent model in which they show that equilibrium extortion does not occur. Extortion in their model takes the form of the supervisor hiding positive evidence: unlike in the current paper, he is unable to fabricate negative evidence. When extortion occurs, the supervisor extracts a large enough payment so that the agent's utility is the same if there is positive evidence as if there is no evidence.
34 But then the principal can give the agent the same incentives with a contract that rewards the agent equally for positive evidence and no evidence, and in which the supervisor has no scope to extort the agent by hiding positive evidence. Note, moreover, that Khalil et al rule out by assumption the possibility of directly deterring and punishing extortion, so the question of optimal punishments for extortion does not really arise in their paper.
Appeals
Many justice systems grant litigants a right of appeal under some conditions. Such rights protect litigants from imperfections in the legal process, including court corruption. How should appeal rights be granted if the objective is to minimize court corruption?
I focus on the case of just one round of appeal. There are three distinct ways in which appeal rights can be allocated. (I) Only the party being incentivized by the contract (i.e., the agent) has the right to appeal. (II) Only the nonincentivized party (i.e., the principal) has the right of appeal. (III) Both parties have the right to appeal.
Formally, the timing of events is as follows. First, parties litigate the case as described in the main model. Following the court ruling, one or both parties (depending on the appeals arrangement) has the right to appeal the case. In this case, the parties return to court with a new judge. The corruption costs of the first and second judge are uncorrelated.
Proposition 8 (Corruption-minimizing appeals) Corruption costs are lowest under appeals arrangement (I).
The key to understanding Proposition 8 is to recall from Proposition 1 that while judicial corruption affects court outcomes and the expected utility of the party in the right, it has no effect on the expected utility of the party in the wrong. In other words, the judge expropriates any benefit the party in wrong might gain from affecting the court outcome.
Suppose first that only the agent is allowed to appeal, and consider the equilibrium event in which the agent takes action a = G. On the one hand, if the principal wins the initial trial the agent can appeal and the principal's expected utility from the second trial (net of bribe payments and corruption costs) is simply −t G . But on the other hand, if the principal loses the initial trial he cannot appeal and immediately pays t G to the agent. Consequently, the principal has no stake in the outcome of the initial trial, 35 and so does not bribe the judge -but then the judge is unable to extort the agent either. Hence equilibrium corruption is eliminated by agent-only appeal. In contrast, corruption would still occur under agent-only appeal in the out-of-equilibrium event that the agent takes action a = B, because in this case the principal has something at stake in the initial trial.
Similar effects arise under principal-only appeal, but with the states reversed: corruption is now eliminated in the out-of-equilibrium event that the agent takes action a = B, but still occurs in the equilibrium event that he takes action a = G.
Finally, allowing both sides to appeal renders the decision of the first judge irrelevant, and so is equivalent to the basic model with no appeals stage.
Many criminal law systems protect defendants against double-jeopardy. That is, while a criminal defendant is allowed to appeal a guilty verdict, the prosecutor does not enjoy the symmetric right to appeal an innocent verdict. This is exactly appeals arrangement (I), which Proposition 8 suggests is optimal from the perspective of minimizing corruption. Hence Proposition 8 both provides a possible rationale for protection against double-jeopardy in criminal law, 36 and suggests that in justice systems afflicted by high corruption levels it may be desirable to extend this protection to civil litigation.
Robustness
Settlement out of court (renegotiation)
Thus far I have assumed that, following the agent's action a, the parties always go to court and have their contract enforced. However, the parties have an incentive to try to settle out of court, since doing so enables them to avoid making payments to the judge and other corruption costs.
Under standard bargaining assumptions, the payoffs to the principal and agent if they settle out of court are determined by their outside options, in this case, what they would get by proceeding to court; their relative bargaining strengths; and the surplus available from reaching agreement, i.e., settling. The surplus available from avoiding going to court is C (Z) after both a = G and a = B. Under the standard assumption that the bargaining strengths of the two parties depend only on their identities, and not on the state (here, the agent's action a), it follows that the incentives provided to the agent are unaffected by out-of-court settlement.
If the parties were able to successfully settle out of court all the time, the cost on contracting produced by court corruption would vanish. In this case, the only constraint imposed by court corruption is the upper bound on attainable incentives identified in Proposition 2.
If instead settlement negotiations fail with some probability λ>0, then all of the prior results relating to the cost of contracting continue to holdalthough, of course, the cost is quantitatively lower.
36 Here, one needs to interpret the principal as a public-sector prosecutor. Although public-sector prosecutors rarely derive direct monetary rewards from winning a court case, they often benefit from enhanced career prospects (Boylan 2005) . Likewise, prosecutors may be able to influence judges in ways other than direct payments. The general conclusion of Proposition 8 does not depend on the specific modelling of the way in which parties influence the judge.
Different specifications of the corruption process
This paper uses one specific, albeit standard, model of the corruption process, namely an all-pay auction. Clearly different specifications are possible. However, the paper's results are relatively insensitive to the specific model of corruption used. In particular, an earlier draft of the paper instead assumed a form of Bertrand competition in illicit payments, with the judge only accepting a payment from one of the two parties. The results were qualitatively the same.
Alternate specifications of the cost of making illicit payments
The analysis is based on one specific parameterization of the costs of making illicit payments, namely, there is a fixed cost to making a strictly positive payment. Other parameterizations are clearly possible. In particular, it is possible that the cost of making an illicit payment grows in the size of the payment. Here, I briefly discuss just such an alternative parameterization. Formally, suppose that after the agent takes action a = G, the costs to a judge of accepting payments x A and x P are ϕ e (x A ) and ϕ b (x P ) respectively, while the costs to the agent and principal of making these payments are κ e (x A ) and κ b (x P ). The functions ϕ e , ϕ b ,κ e and κ b are all continuous, and equal 0 when evaluated at 0. Analogous to before, the judge rules for the agent if x A − ϕ e (x A ) +α 0 ≥x P − ϕ b (x P ).
I assume that larger payments are more valuable to the judge, i.e., both x−ϕ e (x) and x−ϕ b (x) are increasing, and write ψ e and ψ b for the inverses of these functions. Because the costs are all continuous, Siegel's (2009) analysis then applies directly. Assuming that the cost functions are such that the party in the wrong -here, the principal -is the marginal agent in Siegel's sense, the principal's payoff is V G P = 0 and the agent's payoff is
0 . An important property of the main model is that as contractual incentives Z increase, actual incentives are bounded above (Proposition 2). This property holds for the alternate cost structure just described whenever V G A converges to a constant as Z grows large, which in turn is the case when the ratio (κe•ψ e ) ((κb•ψb)
converges to 1. Economically, this condition says that when both parties are making large payments, the marginal cost of further increases in these payments is approximately the same for both partiesregardless which party is in the right. For example, this condition is satisfied if the cost functions ϕ e , ϕ b ,κ e and κ b are all linear, with ϕ e = ϕ b and κ e =κ b .
Conclusion
The paper studies the impact of judicial corruption on the incentives provided by contracts, and, in turn, the response of contracting parties. Judicial corruption forces contracting parties to employ higher-powered contracts, which in turn raise judges' incentives to behave corruptly. Consequently, the cost that corruption imposes on contracting parties (expected payments to judges) is sharply increasing in the incentives that the contract seeks to provide. For the same reason, the total incentives that can be contractually provided are bounded above. The analysis suggests that in some circumstances parties prefer to leave contracts or contract contingencies unwritten rather than subject themselves to litigating the contract in a corrupt court. Moreover, and as discussed, one can straightforwardly reinterpret the model's illicit payments to the judge as lawyers' fees. The analysis implies that appeal rights should be granted only to the party being incentivized, as is common in criminal law. Moreover, the analysis implies that extortion should not be punished.
The idea that a contracting party should not be punished for making a payment in response to an extortive threat squares well with many people's intuitions. However, the implication that the judge should also not be punished for extortion is more surprising. The main logic behind this result is that punishing extortion -that is, illicit payments from the party in the right to the judge -makes it easier for the party in the wrong to win the case. Of course, there are circumstances in which it is simply too costly for the party in the wrong to influence the judge (formally, if Γ b > Z), and in such cases, punishing extortion protects the party in the right. However, in these cases it is not credible for the judge to decide the case incorrectly, and so he is unable to extort the party in the right -independent of how lightly or heavily extortion is punished.
However, one may want to consider a perturbation of the model in which the judge can extort the party in the right even when there is no chance of the party in the wrong paying a bribe. (Of course, this perturbation raises the question of how an extortive threat would be credible in this case.) In such a model, punishing extortion would have some value, although the effect identified by the current model would still be present: punishing extortion disadvantages the party in the right relative to the party in the wrong. Which effect dominates is then a quantitative matter.
Finally, the paper has focused on the case in which judges act to maximize their individual self-interest. As the analysis demonstrates, this makes dealing with the court system costly for contracting parties, and in turn reduces the amount of contracting. An interesting question is then whether judges would wish to ex ante commit to limit the scope for court corruption, in order to increase the amount of contracting and hence increase their total income from corruption (though at the cost of less income per court case). An argument along these lines would generate the possibility that court systems (via unions or guilds of court employees) might be capable of partially policing themselves to limit corruption.
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A Appendix
For use in Section 6 on appeals, I establish slightly more general versions of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 than stated in the main text. Specifically, I consider a slight generalization of the payoff functions, in which the party in the right gains δZ instead of Z, i.e.,
I regularly omit the argument δfor the leading case of δ= 1. Note that the statement in the main text that if a = G then sup X A ≤Z −γ e is replaced with sup X A ≤δZ −γ e . Lemma 1: As stated in the main text, with the exception that in part (C), the principal's strategy has uniform density 1 δZ . Proof of Lemma 1: Part (A): Standard arguments. In brief, suppose that the agent's strategy has an atom strictly above α e . Then the principal would never make a payment in the interval immediately below the atom. But then the agent can deviate from the atom to a lower payment. Part (B): Standard arguments. For the upper bonds, clearly if sup X A −α e = sup X P −α b −α 0 then one of the parties has a profitable deviation. For the lower bounds, note first that if inf X A −α e > inf X P −α b −α 0 then the principal's strategy must have no mass in (inf X P , inf X A −α e +α b +α 0 ]; but then the agent can deviate downwards, giving a contradiction. By a similar argument, inf X A −α e < inf X P −α b −α 0 is also impossible. If inf X P −α b −α 0 > 0, then the principal can profitably deviate downwards. The argument for the absence of holes is also similar. Part (C): The principal's payoff to paying x P is −x P −γ b + Z Pr (x A −α e ≤x P −α b −α 0 ). Differentiation with respect to x P implies that the agent's strategy must have a uniform density of 1 Z over the interior of X A . The result for the principal's strategy follows symmetrically. QED Proposition 1: Suppose the agent took action a = G. An equilibrium of the payment game exists, is unique, and has the following properties: If corruption costs are high, i.e., Γ b > Z, then neither party makes a payment; the agent wins the case; V G P = 0; and V G A =δZ. If corruption costs are low, i.e., Z >Γ b >Γ e + (1 −δ) Z, then both parties make payments with positive probability;
The principal does not make a payment here, since only a payment of at least α 0 +α b can lead to him winning, and this exceeds the amount at stake Z net of the cost of paying the bribe, γ b . So the agent does not make a payment either, and wins. Case: Z >Γ b >Γ e + (1 −δ) Z, i.e., Z >α 0 +α b +γ b >α e +γ e + (1 −δ) Z Let µ A and η A be the masses at payments 0 and α e in the agent's strategy, and µ P and η P be the masses at 0 and α 0 +α b in the principal's strategy. Note that since sup X A − inf X A < Z, it follows from Lemma 1 that µ A +η A > 0 and µ P +η P > 0. Writex = sup X A , so that sup X P =x +α b −α e +α 0 .
There is no equilibrium in which both X A and X P have zero mass, since then paying x P =α 0 +α b would be a strictly profitable deviation for the principal. There is no equilibrium in which X A has zero mass and X P has positive mass, since in such an equilibrium X P = {α 0 +α b }, but then paying x A =α e would be a strictly profitable deviation for the agent. There is no equilibrium in which X P has zero mass and X A has positive mass, since in such an equilibrium X A = {α e }, but then paying x P =α 0 +α b + ε would be a strictly profitable deviation for the principal for any ε > 0 sufficiently small.
Suppose that µ P = 0, i.e., the principal always makes a strictly positive payment. So η P > 0, and hence η A = 0 (since otherwise the principal has a profitable deviation away from α 0 +α b ). So µ A > 0, and when the agent does not make a payment he always loses. This impliesx =δZ −γ e . But then the principal's payoff approaches Z − (δZ −γ e +α b −α e +α 0 ) −γ b as x P → sup X P =x. By supposition this is strictly negative, implying that the principal would do strictly better making a zero payment.
Hence µ P > 0, i.e., the principal sometimes makes no payment. Since the principal always loses if he makes no payment, his payoff from all strategies in his equilibrium support must be 0. Sox +α b −α e +α 0 +γ b = Z, i.e., x = Z −α 0 − (α b +γ b ) +α e . So the agent's payoff from all strategies in his support must be δZ −x −γ e = − (1 −δ) Z +α 0 + (α b +γ b ) − (α e +γ e ).
Finally, I confirm that an equilibrium actually exists, i.e., that there exist µ A ,η A , µ P and η P such that¯x
−αe δZ = 1−µ P −η P (the total probability mass on each player's strategy is 1), and δZµ P ≤δZ −x−γ e , with equality if µ A > 0 (the lefthand side is agent's payoff from making no payment, the righthand side is his payoff from the payment sup X A ). The last of these conditions implies 1 − µ P ≥¯x +γ e δZ , and so η P > 0. By prior arguments it follows that η A = 0 and µ A > 0. So
. It is straightforward to check that all three probabilities lie in (0, 1). QED
The main text refers to the following result:
Proposition A-1 Suppose the agent took action a = G. An equilibrium of the payment game exists, is unique, and has the following properties: If Z >Γ b and Γ e + (1 −δ) Z >Γ b and Γ e >δZ then only the principal makes a payment, and he wins the case; V P = Z − (α 0 +α b ); and V A = 0. If Z >Γ b and Γ e + (1 −δ) Z >Γ b and δZ >Γ e then both parties make payments with positive probability; V P = (1 −δ) Z +Γ e −Γ b ; and V A = 0. If δ≤1 the agent wins with a strictly lower probability than the principal.
Proof of Proposition A-1: Case: Z >Γ b and Γ e + (1 −δ) Z >Γ b and Γ e >δ Z, i.e., Z >α 0 +α b +γ b and α e +γ e + (1 −δ) Z >α 0 +α b +γ b and α e +γ e >δZ. The agent makes no payment here, since the minimum payment the judge accepts, α e , combined with the agent's cost, γ e , exceeds the amount δZ at stake for the agent. Given the agent makes no payment, the principal pays α 0 +α b and wins the case. Case: Z >Γ b and Γ e + (1 −δ) Z >Γ b and δZ >Γ e , i.e., Z >α 0 +α b +γ b and α e +γ e + (1 −δ) Z >α 0 +α b +γ b and δZ >α e +γ e .
As in the case Z >α 0 +α b +γ b >α e +γ e +(1 −δ) Z analyzed in Proposition 1, both X A and X P have strictly positive mass. As in the proof of Proposition 1, let µ A and η A be the masses at payments 0 and α e in the agent's strategy, and µ P and η P be the masses at 0 and α 0 +α b in the principal's strategy. Note that since sup X A − inf X A < Z, it follows from Lemma 1 that µ A +η A > 0 and µ P +η P > 0. Writex = sup X A , so that sup X P =x +α b −α e +α 0 .
Suppose that µ P > 0, i.e., the principal sometimes makes no payment. Equating the principal's payoff from his maximum payment and and no payment impliesx = Z −α 0 −α b −γ b +α e . But then the agent's payoff from paying x A =x is δZ − Z +α 0 +α b +γ b −α e −γ e < 0, and so he would strictly gain from deviating and making no payment.
Consequently, µ P = 0, i.e., the principal always makes a payment, and hence η P > 0 and η A = 0, and so µ A > 0. The agent always loses if he makes no payment, and so equating his payoffs from no payment and the maximal payment,x =δZ −γ e . So the agent's payoff is 0, and the principal's payoff is Z − (x +α b −α e +α 0 ) −γ b = (1 −δ) Z +γ e +α e −α 0 − (α b +γ b ) > 0.
Finally, I confirm that an equilibrium actually exists. In order for the probability mass of both parties strategies to equal 1, 1 −η P =¯x . It is straightforward to check that both µ A and η P lie in (0, 1). The principal has no profitable deviation, since his payoff from any payment in his equilibrium strategy is strictly positive (see above), while his payoff from making no payment is zero.
Note that the agent's probability of winning is (1 − µ A ) η P + 1 2
(1 −η P ) = 1 2
(1 − µ A ) (1 +η P ). Since µ A = 1 −δ+δη P , this expression rewrites to which is increasing in z since Z * is increasing in z, and I (Z) /Z is decreasing in Z by Proposition 2. QED Proof of Proposition 5: Letα=α 0 +α b , and write H for its distribution function. Then I (Z) can be written in the form I = u (α) dH (α), where α is increasing and continuous except for atα= Z −γ b . An easy adaptation of standard arguments implies that if the distribution H first-order stochastically dominates the distribution˜H, then u (α) dH (α) > ũ (α) dH (α). The result follows. QED Proof of Proposition 8: Appeals arrangement (III) renders the decision of the first judge irrelevant. Consequently, appeals arrangement (III) is equivalent to the basic model with no appeals stage.
Next, consider appeals arrangement (I). If the agent takes action a = G, and the first judge rules for the agent, since the principal cannot appeal the payoffs for the principal and the agent are simply −t G and t G = t B + Z (ignoring any bribes and corruption costs, which at this point are sunk). If instead the first judge rules for the principal, the agent will appeal and the payoffs for the principal and the agent are −t G + E V
